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The voter recall of California judge Aaron Persky in June2018 was a watershed cultural moment. For the first timein more than forty years, a sitting judge had been removed
from the bench, by the local citizenry, in a special election. The
recall—instigated in reaction to Judge Persky’s lenient sentence
for a defendant convicted of three counts of sexual assault—was
hailed as a major political victory for the #MeToo movement,
and a sign of an emerging consensus that soft treatment of sex
offenders within the justice system is no longer acceptable.
Any questions about the sustainability of the moment were
answered five months later, when Alaska voters removed
another experienced trial judge, Michael Corey, on similar
grounds. Like Judge Persky, Judge Corey drew national atten-
tion after granting a light sentence to a sexual offender. As was
true with Judge Persky, the sentence stirred widespread dismay
and local protest. And as they had with Judge Persky, political
activists rapidly organized to remove Judge Corey from the
bench, arguing that his actions constituted a dereliction of
judicial duty. The campaigns in California and Alaska
employed similar messaging and similar methods of outreach.
And both campaigns saw the judge’s removal as merely the first
step of a larger political movement to change existing law and
social attitudes about sexual assault. 
Given their outward resemblance, it is tempting to view the
ousters of Judge Persky and Judge Corey as the shared—even
inevitable—product of a particular cultural and political era.
But in one important respect, the two events were fundamen-
tally different. Judge Persky faced a recall election, a process
that is both rare and difficult to implement, and which is specif-
ically designed as an outlet for voters to protest particular judi-
cial decisions. By contrast, Judge Corey faced a retention elec-
tion, an occurrence that is both automatic and routine, and
which is designed to allow voters to assess the judge’s overall
performance without regard to specific decisions. Recall elec-
tions and retention elections have different purposes, different
histories, and, typically, different outcomes. That a recall effort
and a retention bid could produce such similar campaigns, with
such similar results, is therefore noteworthy.
The crossover nature of the anti-Corey campaign also mer-
its close attention. Recall campaigns are premised on popular
accountability, and are intended in part to channel voter out-
rage over particular judicial decisions or comments. Retention
elections, by contrast, embrace a vision of professional
accountability, a broader view that focuses on a judge’s skill,
competence, and demeanor. Until 2018, the tone and tactics of
recall elections had never worked in a retention setting. But the
campaign against Judge Corey bucked this trend, successfully
turning a retention election into a referendum on a single judi-
cial decision. It is a worrisome development. 
JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE PURSUIT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
This article examines the contrasting visions of judicial
accountability in recall and retention elections, with particular
application to the anti-Corey campaign. Judicial accountability
is a core component of judicial legitimacy, which itself is a
reflection of the public’s faith in the courts’ institutional com-
petence. Judicial legitimacy flows from the belief that judges
will interpret and apply the law in a generally trustworthy
manner consistent with their constitutional obligations.1 Legit-
imacy is the lifeblood of the courts: without it, they cannot
obtain public support for their rulings,2 or even the material
resources they need to operate.3
The methods by which judges are selected or removed
occupy a central role in establishing the courts’ legitimacy. This
is true because—unlike private organizations that can hire the
candidates most suited to their needs and goals—courts lack
the power to choose their own members. It is therefore imper-
ative upon those who do select judges to provide the courts
with jurists who are capable and willing to rule fairly, honestly,
and thoughtfully. Judges must be sufficiently independent that
their decisions are not unduly influenced by political or social
pressure, and sufficiently accountable that their decisions are
grounded in established legal principles and practices. The his-
tory of judicial selection in the United States reflects an ongo-
ing conversation about how best to accomplish that balance.
From the earliest days of the Republic, it was understood
that protecting the legitimacy of the courts meant adequately
distancing judges from the patronage of individual political
actors. Accordingly, eight of the thirteen original states vested
judicial appointment power in the state legislature, and the
remaining five required an independent council to advise on or
approve the governor’s judicial choices.4 Save a couple of local
experiments, legislative or council-based gubernatorial
appointment remained the dominant form of state judicial
selection for the next seventy-five years. 
In the 1840s, however, a series of financial panics triggered
by overspending state governments seriously eroded citizen
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trust in their legislatures.5 The episode raised questions not
only about the institutional competence of state representa-
tives, but also of the judges they appointed. Reformers argued
that if judges who owed their office to legislators were not
independent enough to prevent legislative malfeasance, a dif-
ferent method of selecting judges was needed. The agreed-
upon solution was direct elections, reflecting the belief that
judges who were directly chosen by the people could protect
against corruption or incompetence in the other branches.
New York adopted direct elections in 1846, and many other
states quickly followed suit. By 1861, the majority of states
(twenty-four in all) had changed their constitutions to provide
for selection of judges by popular vote. 6
Direct elections resolved public concerns about undue judi-
cial fealty to legislatures, but over time elections themselves
came under fire. For one thing, candidates running for judicial
office had to align themselves with a political party, which
seemed at odds with the impartial administration of justice. Of
even greater concern, judges in many cities eventually became
enmeshed in machine politics.7 Democratic party boss Tom
Pendergast, for example, notoriously controlled all judicial
bids in Kansas City for decades, rewarding judges who ruled in
his favor and seeking a swift end to the careers of those who
dared to rule against him.8
Such blatant exercises of political control inspired another
modification—nonpartisan elections—which permitted judi-
cial candidates to appear on the ballot without a party desig-
nation. This selection method removed some of the overtly
political tones from contested judicial elections, but still left
open the question of whether a judge so accountable to a sin-
gle group of voters (or party bosses) could truly be seen as
impartial.9 As the twentieth century dawned, the public com-
mitment to the courts’ institutional legitimacy endured, but
the optimal method of balancing judicial accountability and
judicial independence remained elusive.
RETENTION ELECTIONS AND THE SHIFT TO 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
In 1914, Northwestern University law professor Albert
Kales proposed a new type of selection method known as merit
selection. The proposal eliminated contested elections alto-
gether and replaced them with a system that allocated the
responsibility of judicial selection among a number of different
actors.10 Specifically, it called for a nonpartisan nominating
commission to present a slate of qualified judicial candidates
to the governor, who would then appoint one of the nominees
to an open seat. Each appointed judge would subsequently face
periodic retention elections, in which the judge would run
unopposed, the only question
facing voters being whether the
judge should be retained on the
bench. The proposal was quickly
embraced by the American Judi-
cature Society, and later by the
American Bar Association.
Merit selection was designed
in part to improve public percep-
tions of the courts’ institutional
competence, by embracing pro-
fessional accountability and
expertise as core principles of the judicial role. This was no
accident. In the early twentieth century, lawyers themselves
were undergoing a professional revolution, highlighted by the
emergence of graduate legal instruction and an organized bar,
and the same technocratic ideals were being carried over to the
judiciary.11 Merit selection accordingly utilized a similarly
technocratic mechanism for choosing judges. It relied on a
commission of knowledgeable experts, assuring (at least in
theory) that only the most qualified and capable judges would
be selected. It sought to hold newly appointed judges account-
able for their efficiency and workmanship, rather than specific
case outcomes. And if an unqualified or nakedly partisan judge
somehow slipped through the initial selection process, reten-
tion elections guaranteed that voters could remove the offend-
ing judge on their own.
Retention elections were arguably the foremost innovation
of the Kales proposal, designed to avoid the characteristics of
contested judicial elections—fundraising, advertising, public
policy pronouncements, interest group meetings, and currying
favor with party bosses—that most clearly undermined the
courts’ institutional legitimacy. Running unopposed and solely
on his or her own record, a judge could sidestep these political
landmines. But retention elections presented another problem:
most voters did not know enough about their judges to make
meaningful decisions about whether they should be retained.
As a consequence, some voters chose not to cast retention bal-
lots at all, while others relied on low-quality proxy information
about the judge—such as the judge’s surname or perceived
gender or ethnicity—to inform their decisions.12
One solution to this knowledge gap was to provide voters
with information regarding each judge’s professional skills and
demeanor, either informally through polls of local bar associa-
tions or formally through state-run judicial performance evalua-
tion (JPE) programs. The first JPE program began in Alaska in
1975, and similar programs had spread to nineteen states by the
mid-2000s. In its most robust form, JPE evaluates individual
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judges on five criteria directly
related to the process of adjudica-
tion, using a variety of informa-
tional sources.13 The outcomes of
particular cases are never consid-
ered as part of the evaluation. Inde-
pendent, nonpartisan commissions
then decide whether each evaluated
judge meets a set of predetermined
performance standards, and trans-
mit that information to voters
through voter guides, websites, and
(increasingly) social media. By
focusing on the qualities that make
a judge a good professional, JPE
programs aim to improve both judi-
cial accountability (by presenting
meaningful information to voters about a sitting judge’s perfor-
mance) and judicial independence (by educating voters about
the content-neutral qualities they should expect in a judge).
Indeed, the capacity of JPE programs to emphasize and contex-
tualize judicial professionalism has led to their adoption not just
in merit-selection states, but also in states with appointment sys-
tems and contested judicial elections.
Today, a mosaic of judicial selection methods is in use across
the country, encompassing gubernatorial and legislative
appointment, partisan and nonpartisan elections, and merit
selection, in addition to local variants. Regardless of their pre-
ferred methods, however, states continue to emphasize the
importance of their courts’ institutional legitimacy, and most
states have embraced judicial professionalism as a key contrib-
utor to that goal.
RECALL ELECTIONS AS A FORM OF POPULAR
ACCOUNTABILITY
Retention elections came out of a longstanding national dia-
logue about the best way to construct a legitimate judiciary. Not
so for recall elections, which from their inception were seen as
a narrower housecleaning measure. The impetus for recall was
a political battle between judges and social reformers during the
first two decades of the twentieth century. During that period,
the Supreme Court invalidated several notable pieces of eco-
nomic and social legislation, drawing the wrath of populists
and Progressives. Theodore Roosevelt and William Jennings
Bryan, among others, characterized the judges responsible for
these decisions as unaccountable actors who bent the law to
suit their own economic and social philosophies, and argued
that such decisions would undermine the broader legitimacy of
the judiciary. These concerns nourished an ultra-reform move-
ment at both the state and federal level, which sought to give
the public much greater control over judges and their decisions. 
A key plank in the ultra-reform platform was the recall elec-
tion, a tool that would allow voters to remove judges who were
perceived as not properly discharging their responsibilities. As
one proponent explained, recall elections were a way to surgi-
cally excise unaccountable judges from an otherwise trustwor-
thy judicial branch.14 In 1903, California became the first state
to allow the popular recall of judges, and several other states
quickly followed suit.15 At the state and federal level, Progres-
sives also suggested allowing voters to recall (that is, override)
specific judicial decisions.16
Because judicial recall is such a blunt and potent tool for pub-
lic management of the judiciary, states adopting the procedure
intentionally made it difficult to implement. In California, for
example, merely placing a recall of a superior court judge on the
ballot requires proponents to prepare, file, and publish a notice
of intention; prepare and receive approval of the recall petition;
collect valid signatures equal to at least 20 percent of the last
vote for the office; and file the petition before a designated statu-
tory deadline.17 The vast majority of recall efforts stumble over
these early hurdles and die out well before Election Day.18
Even with these procedural protections in place to prevent
abuse, judicial recall was not universally supported. Indeed,
prominent conservatives of the Progressive Era—among them
William Howard Taft and Roscoe Pound—were horrified by
the idea. They argued instead that any sort of election involv-
ing judges “enmeshed the judiciary in politics, undermined
respect for the courts, and discouraged the selection of highly
qualified jurists.”19 Recall elections also clashed with the
developing notions of judicial professionalism, which Taft held
dear and which he routinely touted during and after his presi-
dency. In a moment of high drama in 1911, then-President Taft
vetoed a joint congressional resolution that would have admit-
ted Arizona to the Union, specifically because the proposed
state constitution provided for judicial recall.20 Still, recall
remained in the public discourse, and many states—seeing no
philosophical inconsistency between recall and retention—
eventually adopted both practices.
THE DIVERGENT PATHS OF RECALL AND RETENTION
ELECTIONS
Recall and retention elections differ not only in their goals,
but also in the way they have been used over time. Recall elec-
tions represent a rare and particularly combustible form of
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judicial accountability. Before the Persky vote last June, there
had not been a successful recall of a state judge since 1977,
when Wisconsin judge Archie Simonson was removed from
the bench in reaction to his controversial statements about the
community’s “sexually permissive environment” during the
sentencing of a teenage boy convicted of rape.21 In both the
Persky and Simonson episodes, popular outrage over a specific
incident fueled the recall movement.
None of this has been characteristic of retention elections,
which occur on a set schedule in merit selection states, and
which emphasize professional, as opposed to popular, account-
ability for judges. With the inclusion of JPE programs in many
states, retention elections are increasingly framed as an exercise
in citizen-initiated professional review. Voters are asked to con-
sider the judge’s demonstrated administrative ability, communi-
cation skills, legal knowledge, impartiality, and courtroom
demeanor—all aspects of professionalism and all divorced from
assessment of particular decisions or case outcomes. As a result,
most retention elections have evolved into relatively quiet and
apolitical affairs. To be sure, there have been periodic efforts to
not retain judges in reaction to specific case outcomes, mostly
originating from the right side of the political spectrum. But
perhaps because citizens in merit-selection states have been
conditioned to expect their judges to be impartial, professional,
and fair, these single-issue campaigns are rarely successful.
Indeed, even when judges decide controversial issues shortly
before an election, voters typically choose to retain them on the
basis of their overall professionalism and body of work.22
Campaigns against the retention of specific judges have
found success on rare occasions, but never by making the elec-
tion a referendum on a particular case outcome. Instead, these
campaigns have asserted more broadly that the targeted judges
lacked professionalism and institutional humility. In 1986, for
example, three California supreme court justices lost their bids
for retention after an extensive campaign aimed at their deci-
sions to overturn death sentences in several criminal cases.23
Although the motivation for the campaign was a substantive
disagreement over the acceptability of capital punishment, the
message to the voters—at least in part—was something more
fundamental: the targeted judges had overstepped their insti-
tutional role, substituted their judgment for that of the people,
and compromised the legitimacy of the judiciary itself.24 In
three other instances in which state supreme court justices
were not retained—in Nebraska and Tennessee in 1996,25 and
in Iowa in 201026—the anti-retention campaigns employed the
same strategy, framing the tar-
geted judges’ decisions not as a
mere policy preference, but rather
as an egregious example of pro-
fessional dereliction and institu-
tional overreach.27
The success of these particular
anti-retention campaigns illus-
trates how deeply engrained
impartiality and humility are in
citizen expectations of the judge’s
professional role. The campaign
organizers recognized that voters
expected their judges to respect
the legislative process, the separa-
tion of powers, and the rule of
law more generally. Accordingly, these anti-retention cam-
paigns deliberately focused on the limited role of the courts in
the larger structure of American government, allowing them to
further suggest that the targeted judges had made policy
choices that were properly left to the legislature or to the peo-
ple themselves.28
It bears emphasis that even this theme of institutional over-
reach rarely produces the desired results for anti-retention
forces. Most judges who face retention cannot be easily carica-
tured as overstepping their bounds or acting outside of their
responsibilities. Most professionally sound judges are retained.
And the handful of judges who lack professional demeanor or
competence are usually not returned on those grounds alone. 
Judicial retention elections across the country in 2018 were
largely consistent with these historical trends. Most judges seek-
ing to continue their service were comfortably retained; those
who were not retained typically had received poor performance
evaluations. But 2018 also witnessed the emergence of a new
kind of anti-retention campaign, built on the model of Persky
recall, which was seen most clearly in the efforts to remove
Judge Michael Corey from his seat on the Alaska Superior Court. 
THE UNCONVENTIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST JUDGE
COREY
Judge Corey was first appointed to the bench in 2014, and
faced a retention election at the end of his four-year term. In
August 2018, Corey received a strong performance evaluation
from the Alaska Judicial Council, which unanimously recom-
mended that voters retain him.29 But with only weeks before
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the election, a seemingly quiet
retention bid would become
much more explosive.
In mid-September, Judge
Corey was asked to approve a
plea agreement in a criminal case
involving stomach-churning
facts. The defendant was alleged
to have offered a ride to the vic-
tim, which she accepted. He
drove her to a dead-end street,
where he asked her to get out of
the car, tackled her, and strangled
her until she lost consciousness. He then ejaculated onto her
body and waited until she regained consciousness before dri-
ving away. The defendant was initially charged with first-
degree kidnapping, two counts of assault, and misdemeanor
harassment for contacting the victim with a bodily fluid. How-
ever, prosecutors dropped the kidnapping charge after con-
cluding that they would not be able to meet their burden of
proof at trial. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to the
greater assault charge, which, given his otherwise clean crimi-
nal history, carried a sentence of zero to two years in jail. The
state and the defendant eventually reached a plea deal calling
for a two-year sentence with one year suspended, and three
years probation. The defendant also would receive credit for
time served while wearing an ankle monitor. Significantly, this
meant that he would face no additional jail time.
At the plea hearing, Judge Corey probed the prosecution
about the adequacy of the proposed plea deal.30 Of particular
concern was that the crime was plainly sexual in nature, yet
the defendant had not been charged with sexual assault and
was not even required to register as a sex offender. The prose-
cutor explained that the defendant’s actions, while appalling,
did not qualify as a sex crime under Alaska law. The prosecu-
tor also noted that the state had insisted on probation as a way
to require the defendant to undergo sex-offender treatment.31
Judge Corey described the case as “breathtaking,”32 and
commented that the proposed sentence “at first blush would
really quite frankly strike me as way too light.”33 Nevertheless,
he felt constrained by several aspects of Alaska law in deter-
mining whether to accept the agreement. Among other things,
he could not consider the charges that had been dropped by
the prosecution, nor could he propose a sentence aggravator
on his own.34 After a 30-minute hearing, Judge Corey accepted
the plea agreement, based heavily on the defendant’s prospects
for rehabilitation, as well as the judge’s stated belief that the
attorneys in the case knew “far better and more about the case
than I do presently. They know more about what can be proven
and what can’t.”35
The decision to accept the plea deal made national news
almost immediately, and quickly gave rise to a local movement
calling itself No More Free Passes. The movement was ani-
mated by two central concerns: the perceived unjustness of the
sentence, and the failure of Judge Corey to discuss the victim
during the plea hearing. No More Free Passes accordingly
identified two corresponding goals: to change the existing law,
and to remove the judge who had approved the plea. 
From the start, the approach taken by No More Free Passes
differed significantly from the handful of previous successful
anti-retention efforts with respect to source, platform, tone,
and underlying assumptions about the proper role of the judi-
ciary. Indeed, its tone and tactics most closely mirrored the
Persky recall campaign months before. Three characteristics of
the campaigns were particularly notable.
First, the push to remove the judge was organized and for-
tified primarily by those on the left side of the political spec-
trum, drawing their energy from the #MeToo movement and
the contemporaneous and controversial confirmation hearings
for Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh.36 This was new.
Historically, aggressive anti-retention campaigns have been ini-
tiated by conservative groups opposed to judicial decisions
concerning capital punishment, abortion, same-sex marriage,
and the state’s taxing power. This development suggests that
retention elections may now become an instrument for mobi-
lization by partisans on both sides of the political spectrum.
Second, social media played a key role in spreading the anti-
retention message. No More Free Passes created a Facebook
page just three days after Judge Corey approved the plea deal,
and immediately began advocating for the judge’s ouster. By
November, the page had approximately 4,000 followers, and
No More Free Passes was updating the page at least daily, elic-
iting thousands of viewer reactions in the process. No More
Free Passes also created a GoFundMe page to solicit donations,
and an Instagram page to spread its message. One of the
group’s founders, Elizabeth Williams, also promoted the cause
on her personal Instagram page with hashtags like #nomore-
freepasses and #nooncorey. And while No More Free Passes did
not take to Twitter directly, the campaign benefited from
dozens of sympathetic tweets by other users in the weeks lead-
ing up the election. To be sure, the anti-Corey campaign also
used traditional media effectively, granting interviews and
writing op-eds for local newspapers and broadcasters. But
social media played a central role in getting the message out.
Finally, the anti-Corey campaign broke most significantly
from previous anti-retention efforts in the way it presented the
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role of the judge. Previously, anti-retention campaigns had
sought to convince voters that the targeted judges had acted
unprofessionally by venturing beyond the limits of their
authority. The fundamental message of the anti-Corey cam-
paign, however, was that the judge had not done enough with
his authority in the face of a potentially unjust outcome. In an
op-ed published the week before the election, the founders of
No More Free Passes wrote, “Judges hold one of the most pow-
erful positions in modern society because we expect them to
exercise judicial discretion.”37 This message represented a
complete reversal from the themes of earlier anti-retention
campaigns, which accused targeted judges of insufficient
humility in exercising their judicial roles. 
The anti-Corey campaign was also able to neutralize the
issue of professional competence which typically influences
retention voting. Just weeks before accepting the plea deal,
Judge Corey had been unanimously recommended for reten-
tion by the Alaska Judicial Council on the basis of his strong
performance evaluation. A good performance review helps to
place isolated controversial decisions in context, and histori-
cally voters have been unwilling to remove a good judge based
on a single case. Despite public reminders about his perfor-
mance evaluation and op-eds from members of the bar urging
voters to place the single decision in broader context, this time
voters were unmoved. It represented the first time in Alaska’s
history that a judge was not retained after receiving a positive
evaluation and recommendation.
In light of the unusual tenor and tactics of the campaign,
there is good reason to view Judge Corey’s non-retention as an
anomaly. Indeed, every other attempt to target judges for specific
decisions (as opposed to poor job performance) during the 2018
election cycle was unsuccessful. Consistent with the history of
retention elections, these anti-retention campaigns only spoke
to a limited portion of the voting population, and (where avail-
able) judicial performance evaluations seemed to serve as a bul-
wark against knee-jerk decisions to remove judges. The fact that
the anti-Corey campaign bucked these trends is therefore note-
worthy. Moreover, the particular facts of the case underlying
Judge Corey’s decision were broadly similar to the facts underly-
ing Judge Persky’s decision, the campaign strategies closely mir-
rored those of the anti-Persky campaign, and the proponents of
the Persky recall offered enthusiastic public support to the anti-
Corey campaign. Given these facts, the non-retention of Judge
Corey is probably best understood as part of a larger popular
backlash situated in a specific cultural moment.38
At the same time, there is rea-
son to see the anti-Corey cam-
paign as something more than an
isolated event, and to believe that
the messaging and mobilization
tactics borrowed from judicial
recalls will become more promi-
nent in future retention elections.
Another anti-retention campaign
from the fall of 2018—this time
to unseat California Supreme
Court Justice Carol Corrigan—
illustrates the concern. Justice
Corrigan was appointed to the
court in 2005 and retained in
2006, entitling her to a subse-
quent twelve-year term. During that time, Justice Corrigan
authored hundreds of opinions on a wide variety of issues, and
was generally well-regarded as a jurist. As the 2018 election
neared, prominent newspapers endorsed her retention. But
activists launched a powerful campaign to remove her, based
entirely on an opinion she had written ten years earlier.  
In May 2008, Justice Corrigan dissented in part from Cali-
fornia’s landmark opinion legalizing same-sex marriage. In the
dissent, she explained that she personally supported same-sex
marriage rights, but believed that the issue was one for the vot-
ers, not the courts, to decide.39 After the state’s voters reen-
acted the state’s ban on same-sex marriage through Proposition
8 in November 2008, she (along with five other justices)
upheld the election result. 
Proposition 8 was eventually struck down in federal court,40
but Justice Corrigan’s dissent in the original same-sex marriage
case was not forgotten. Like the campaign against Judge Corey,
the campaign against Justice Corrigan eschewed charges of
unprofessionalism or institutional overreach, focusing instead
on the single substantive message that the justice had “voted
twice against marriage equality.” An anonymously authored
Facebook page titled “Vote NO on Carol Corrigan—CA
Supreme Court Justice Against Equality” posted at least eigh-
teen sharable photos and videos urging Californians to vote
against retention. On Twitter, the anti-Corrigan campaign was
bolstered by tweets from prominent celebrities as well as ordi-
nary citizens.41 Many social media posts had both a multiplier
and a boomerang effect, originating in California before being
picked up by friends and sympathizers around the country
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(and the world), who in turn urged their associates back in the
justice’s home state to cast a vote against her. As with Judge
Corey, an essentially local election took on national (and inter-
national) dimensions. 
In the end, the campaign against Justice Corrigan was
unsuccessful, and she was retained for another term. But the
ten-year gestation period of the anti-Corrigan campaign sug-
gests that in at least some circumstances, anti-retention activists
are willing to take the long view. In addition, the shared tactics
of the anti-Corey, anti-Corrigan, and anti-Persky campaigns
suggests that in at least some instances, the passions and sub-
stantive messages that more typically animate judicial recall
elections can bleed into regularly scheduled retention elections.
For supporters of a professional and depoliticized judiciary,
the introduction into retention elections of tactics and themes
normally reserved for recall elections is a deeply disconcerting
development. Recall elections are a powerful form of popular
accountability, meant to be used only in the most egregious cir-
cumstances, and are by design difficult to initiate. Retention
elections, by contrast, are designed with a different purpose in
mind, and do not feature these important procedural safe-
guards. Judges appear automatically on the retention ballot,
allowing a last-minute campaign against them to arise with no
warning. As the anti-Corey campaign demonstrates, a passion-
ate electorate can transform a standard retention bid into a de
facto recall election in a matter of weeks.
Recall and retention can coexist, as long as each mechanism
stays true to its intended purpose. But retention elections
should not transform into regularly-scheduled recall elections
by default. Using regular checks of professional accountability
as an opportunity to impose outcome-based accountability
would threaten the decisional independence of individual
judges, and dramatically undermine the judiciary’s overall
legitimacy and institutional competence. 
“MOVING FORWARD” 
The day after Judge Corey lost his retention bid, the leader
of No More Free Passes posted the following message on the
group’s Facebook page: “Moving forward, we will no longer be
discussing Mr. Corey. I believe his family and friends when
they tell me he is a great man, husband, and father. He deserves
privacy and peace during this time. We wish him nothing but
the best in his future.” That sentiment may be cold comfort for
the judge. It should be a wake-up call for all who continue to
desire a judiciary that is professional, fair, and independent.
One must proceed cautiously in attempting to draw broad
conclusions from limited data points. But the events of 2018
do suggest the ongoing need to focus voters on the importance
of a professional and institutionally legitimate judiciary. This
means emphasizing that judges must be accountable to their
professional and institutional obligations, as well as the limits
on judicial discretion that those obligations impose. More
specifically, citizens should be reminded that judges are not at
liberty simply to change or ignore laws with which they dis-
agree. Rather, consistent with their authority and professional
responsibilities, they must do their best to apply valid laws to
the cases before them. 
This is not to suggest that voters will—or even should—
take a neutral view on the outcomes of specific cases. The deci-
sions that animated the campaigns against Judge Persky, Judge
Corey, and Justice Corrigan were quite fairly the subject of
public debate and private anguish. But those campaigns also
arose out of a mistaken belief that judges have the unfettered
authority simply to do “the right thing,” as opposed to labor-
ing within their constitutional and institutional limitations.
Members of the public should understand that the quality of
the judiciary must be determined not by reference to a specific
case, but rather by asking whether judges reach their decisions
in a fair, accurate, and trustworthy manner.
Emphasizing judicial professionalism has a long and suc-
cessful track record of helping to depoliticize judicial selection,
but the message must be updated for the 2020s and beyond. In
the twentieth century, judicial professionalism was equated
with expertise, and the special training and skill that the legal
profession required. The message worked because of the tradi-
tionally high regard given to experts in a given field. But the
current era has seen an increase in public skepticism over
expertise, with many Americans regarding “experts” as noth-
ing more than an undifferentiated mass of wealthy elites.42
Consequently, it may no longer be enough to say that a judge
should be retained because of her training, experience, and
knowledge; it is also necessary to stress the judiciary’s com-
mitment to more modern notions of professionalism, such as
transparency and continuous improvement. Courts themselves
can take a role in this messaging, by routinely sharing the con-
crete steps they are taking to meet the needs of their users and
the general public. 
Courts can also be proactive about reaching out to other
organizations to help spread the message of judicial profes-
sionalism. The organized bar has long been a loyal advocate for
the judiciary, based on its intimate knowledge of the courts and
respect for the rule of law. It is a logical place to start. But
lawyers today are facing the same anti-elite backlash as judges.
Courts may also need to develop connections with less tradi-
tional allies—including perhaps state legislators or community
organizations—to reiterate the importance of judicial profes-
sionalism and institutional legitimacy. An ounce of prevention
today will be worth it, lest the substantive moral certainty of
recall elections become the prevailing lens through which all
future judicial decisions are assessed.
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